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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO  
DE RUEHC #8256/01 1771503  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O P 251504Z JUN 08  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 1413  
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7737  
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 9129  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6713  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5453  
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 9470  
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 4068  
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 0923  
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 7972  
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 7228  
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 1363  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4655  
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0345  
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 4955  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4745  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2940  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0807

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 068256

NOFORN  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [XF](#) [AL](#)  
SUBJECT: ENGAGING HOST GOVERNMENTS ON CERTAIN TERRORIST  
BROADCASTS

REF: SEE PARAGRAPH 8

Classified By: NEA Acting A/S Jeffrey D. Feltman, reasons 1.4 (b)  
and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an Action Cable. Please see paragraphs  
3 and 4.

[1](#)2. (C) Summary. The USG remains concerned about certain  
radio and television broadcasts, particularly in the  
Middle East, that are conducted by designated terrorist  
entities or are likely to incite imminent acts of violence.  
Since 2005, the Department has delivered demarches to  
foreign governments, requesting assistance  
in the removal of certain satellite programming on the  
basis that the specific broadcasting was conducted by  
certain designated terrorist entities or was likely  
to incite imminent acts of violence against Americans.  
This cable requests specific information related to this  
issue by July 9, 2008.  
End Summary.

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Objectives  
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[1](#)3. (C) --For posts to provide to Washington (and to  
maintain) up-to-date information on the names and  
contact information of lead points of contact (and  
backups) at Embassies when specific problems arise.

--To ascertain whether host governments hold one of  
the four rotating ARABSAT board member positions  
(in addition to the five permanent Arabsat board  
members - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and the  
UAE) and provide the names of board members to the  
Department.

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Action Request  
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[1](#)4. (C) Posts are requested to provide the above mentioned

information by cable. Please slug responses to  
NEA/RA Adam Vaccaro, SCA/RA Jerry Brenning, and EEB/CIP/TS  
K. Joseph Burton by July 9, 2008.

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Background:  
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15. (C) The messages of violent extremism contained in certain radio and television broadcasts, particularly in the Middle East, that are conducted by designated terrorist entities or are likely to incite imminent acts of violence pose a serious threat to the lives of U.S. military personnel and other Americans abroad as well as to the stability of friendly governments. Previous Department action requests have included demarches concerned with programming on the following networks: the Lebanese Media Group (LMG), which includes the Hezbollah-owned and run al-Manar TV and al-Nour radio networks, Sunni insurgent-run al-Zawraa TV, and the Hamas-founded al-Aksa (Al Aqsa) TV and radio networks. Note that the United States designated LMG, al-Manar, and al-Nour as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) under E.O. 13224 because they are owned and controlled by Hizballah (which has been designated as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and an SDGT). Hamas, which runs Al-Aqsa, has also been designated as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and an SDGT. Past U.S. demarches

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have resulted in mixed success. One significant challenge has been identifying in a timely fashion host government officials with the necessary technical and policy knowledge, and the requisite authority, to take the actions requested. Based on experience to date, the Department assumes that, in the majority of cases, Chiefs of Mission will need to be personally engaged on these issues when they arise, but advance staff level preparation is essential.

16. (SBU) Communications satellites retransmit back to Earth what is sent to them by a ground station. Further, satellite-operating companies are often distinct from the entities providing programming. A particular broadcast may be originating from any of a number of different countries in a region. Each country may have its own unique licensing regime, both with regard to the technical operation of a ground station and with respect to permissible programming content. Department demarche requests may therefore involve several posts including the post(s) in countries where the satellite operator is headquartered and/or licensed, where the broadcaster is headquartered and/or programming originates, influential neighboring states, and the site of the satellite ground station.

17. (C) Identifying Key Contacts: The Department looks to posts to ensure they have up-to-date contact information for the most appropriate and effective host government and private sector contacts to approach on this issue. Past demarches have centered on host country Ministries of Information, Communications, and Foreign Affairs (and other interlocutors at post discretion) throughout the region as the appropriate channels for approach, whether governmental or, if necessary, corporate. Some broadcast entities (e.g. Arabsat) have boards composed of representatives from member states. In such cases, the USG (normally at the Chief of Mission level) may need to approach ministers or Arabsat board members. In the past, demarches to Arab governments on internal Arabsat broadcasts have been delayed by uncertainty as to board composition.

18. (C) The Department is planning to establish a SIPRNet website on Department efforts to counter certain broadcasts either by designated entities or designed to incite violence against Americans. That website will include the background on prior efforts and resources. Pending completion of the

website, posts may find useful the following compilation of cable communications on this issue over the past three years:

REF:

2005 - State 216186  
2006 - State 011408, State 04660, State 181831  
2007 - State 084112

BAHRAIN:

2005 - Manama 001834  
2007 - Manama 000580

EGYPT:

2005 - Cairo 007547, Cairo 007749, Cairo 007885,  
Cairo 008321, Cairo 009384  
2006 - Cairo 001272, Cairo 001826, Cairo 002432,  
Cairo 002500, Cairo 003901, Cairo 004201, Cairo 004200,  
Cairo 002432, Cairo 005270  
2007 - Cairo 001879, Cairo 001020

IRAQ:

2007 - Baghdad 000643

JORDAN:

2005 - Amman 009719  
2006 - Amman 009101  
2007 - Amman 000669, Amman 002629, Amman 002839

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KUWAIT:

2005 - Kuwait 005061, Kuwait 005083, Kuwait 005099,  
Kuwait 005129  
2006 - Kuwait 000999, Kuwait 002155, Kuwait 068050,  
Kuwait 002155  
2007 - Kuwait 000047, Kuwait 000241, Kuwait 000278,  
Kuwait 000953, Kuwait 000749, Kuwait 000953,  
Kuwait 000953, Kuwait 001337

LEBANON:

2007 - Beirut 000238

LIBYA:

2006 - Tripoli 000095, Tripoli 000438  
2007 - Tripoli 000147, Tripoli 000585

OMAN:

2005 - Muscat 0001839  
2007 - Muscat 000634

QATAR:

2006 - Doha 001277; Doha 000863  
2007 - Doha 000058, Doha 000058, Doha 000233,  
Doha 000863, Doha 000154

SAUDI ARABIA:

2005 - Jeddah 004134, Jeddah 009438  
2006 - Riyadh 000483, Riyadh 002083, Riyadh 009051,  
Riyadh 004035, Riyadh 004082, Riyadh 005366,  
Jeddah 000560, Riyadh 009220  
2007 - Riyadh 000367, Riyadh 000366, Riyadh 000468,  
Riyadh 000507, Riyadh 001183, Jeddah 000331

TUNISIA:

2007 - Tunis 000824, Tunis 000934

UAE:

2006 - Abu Dhabi 001120, Abu Dhabi 003404,  
Abu Dhabi 000008  
2007 - Abu Dhabi 000209, Abu Dhabi 001007

YEMEN:

2007 - Sanaa 001142, Sanaa 001577

RICE